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Abstract 
Why do some negotiations end in agreement and some do not? Are there lessons that 
can be learned from studying negotiations that did not end in agreement? In this paper, I 
examine the history of 19th century Belgium and the events that led up to the 
negotiations over its future in 1830, which ended without agreement. The Kingdom of 
the Netherlands which consisted of Belgium, Luxembourg and northern Netherlands 
was formed at the Vienna Congress in 1815 with a specific purpose of serving as a 
buttress against French expansion. In 1830, due to unfavorable treatment by the Dutch, 
the Belgians rebelled and declared independence. This paper analyzes reasons for the 
lack of agreement in the negotiations that took place at the London Conference between 
the Dutch and the Belgians with the great powers of Europe (Russia, Prussia, Austria 
and Great Britain) acting as mediator. The reasons that contributed to lack of agreement 
in negotiations were the following: the actors all had perceived power asymmetry; the 
great powers were ineffective in their role as a mediator due to their own strategic 
interests; there was a lack of trust between the negotiators as well as towards the 
mediator; King William I could not see benefits of Forward-Looking Outcomes that the 
neutrality of Belgium could bring to his country;  finally, during the course of 
negotiations the mediator neither created nor provided opportunities for Mutually 
Hurting Stalemates or Mutually Enticing Opportunities. As a result of these different 
factors, the negotiations between the Dutch and Belgium did not reach agreement.  
These reasons can be used to understand the outcomes of other negotiations as well as 
to provide guidelines for effective negotiations.  
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Incomplete Negotiations: The Belgium Case 
Dragica Fridl 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
History teaches us that at times small powers due to their geographic location 
and relevance can play a key role in international politics. Nineteenth century Belgium1 
was a rare ‘jewel of Europe’. It was the most sought after ‘prize’ and an intriguing 
puzzle for both eager conquerors and presumptuous European diplomats. No other 
country enjoyed such an attractive strategic geographic location, which since early times 
made it a major arena for its neighbors. This ‘European crossroads’, was the easiest path 
between France and Germany and the best avenue for entry of British goods to the 
Continent. The most solid evidence of its centrality and strategic relevance remains an 
incredible historical record of 21 battlefields within the present Belgian boundaries 
during ancient times, 352 in medieval, and 618 between 1500 and 1932.2 This paper 
will analyze Belgium’s turbulent fate in the 19th century when the country found itself 
in the hands of great powers serving their strategic purpose. It will focus on the 
negotiations that took place over the fate of Belgium within the international system of 
balance of power. The primary goal is to analyze the events that led up to the 
negotiations and the process of negotiations in order to determine the reasons why the 
                                                 
1
 Central Belgium consisted of a corridor, which extended from the Aachen area in the western Germany 
to the Lille-Maubeuge region of northern France. 
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negotiations did not end in agreement. By analyzing the process that took place and 
explaining the outcome through negotiations theory, this paper seeks to contribute to the 
field of negotiations as one can learn as much from negotiations that do not end in 
agreement as from the ones that do.  
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 Next to its central geographic location, frequent invasions of Belgium territory 
were also a result of its economic significance for the region. The Belgians were the 
first to construct national rail system and second to the English in entering the Industrial 
Revolution.3 Belgian Provinces remained a persistent object of contention between the 
French to the west and the Germans to the east, while both Spanish and Austrian 
monarchs ruled the provinces from 1556 to 1792. The French however remained the 
fiercest and most adamant claimants of Belgian territories. They captured the Belgic 
Provinces in 1792, lost them the following year, only to regain and annex them in 
1794.4 In addition, the period between 1776 and 1790 was characterized by instability 
and a series of insurrections that broke out in different countries.5 This period of 
volatility ended in 1814 with the disintegration of Napoleon’s empire, which put 
Belgium’s fate in the hands of European diplomats. Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo and 
the loss of the Belgic Provinces, even though it caused heartache for the French, did not 
discourage them from pursuing their dream of re-annexation of Belgium.6  
                                                                                                                                               
2
 A. de Winter, La Belgique Champ de Bataille de L’Europe, pp. 26-27, 51-54. 105-110. 
3
 Daniel H. Thomas, The Guarantee of Belgian Independence and Neutrality in European Diplomacy, 
1830s-1930s, p.5. 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 These included the American Revolution of 1776, revolutions in Holland, Sweden, Ireland and Geneva 
as well as the Brabant Revolution, the Liege revolution in 1789 and finally the French revolution. Adrien 
de Meeues, History of the Belgians, p. 236. 
6
 The French were encouraged by the fact that the majority of the Belgians spoke French and had already 
accepted French institutions. French authorities came back to the idea in 1829 and made an unsuccessful 
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 With the fall of Napoleon, the Holy Alliance developed into a super-national 
league for the suppression of revolutions and the upholding of the principle of 
monarchical legitimism.7 The actions taken by the Holy Alliance almost erased the 
dividing line between international affairs and the domestic affairs of a State. It 
represented an imposition of a regime by external force and an intervention in the 
internal affairs of a state in the most flagrant manner. Some authors have asserted that 
the conclusion of the pious terms of the Holy Alliance8 in 1815 between Tsar, the 
Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia as well as the righteous resolutions adopted 
three years later by the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle of 1818,9 concerning the sanctity of 
international treaties were a “mere staged show”.10 According to their opinion, the 
emphasis on law and religion served only to mask the real intention of the Powers. 
Throughout the years, their main goal was to maintain the territorial status quo and to 
prevent democratic tendencies from threatening the privileges of the governing classes 
and the absolute rule of the princes. The central goal of European powers was 
buttressing the well-established balance of power system determined at Vienna 
                                                                                                                                               
pursuit of annexing Belgium. This was part of a scheme of Prince Jule de Polignac, who became foreign 
minister and minister of war. The council of state decided to propose that the Belgian provinces be 
annexed by France and the Dutch by Prussia. The British were to be offered the Dutch colonies and if 
they refused to acquiesce. In Sir A. Ward and G.P. Goosch, eds., Cambridge History of British Foreign 
Policy 1783-1919 ( 3 vols., New York, 1922-23), II, 122-23; See also Alfred Stern Geschichte Europas 
seit der Vertragen von 1815 bis zum Frankfurter Frieden von 1871 (10 vols., Berlin 1894-1924), III, 
p.189. 
7
 Woolsey, Introduction to the Study of International Law, p. 49. 
8
 According to Alan Sked in Europe’s Balance of Power 1815-1848, the Holy Alliance was the ‘vaguest 
document ever to trouble European diplomacy’. It bound its signatories to base their foreign policies upon 
the ‘receipts of justice, charity and peace, to treat their fellow sovereigns as ‘brothers’ and to 
acknowledge that the Christian nation as a whole had ‘no other sovereign’ save “God, Our Divine Savior, 
Jesus Christ’. They were also to recommend His teachings to their peoples to bring about the ‘happiness 
of nations’. p. 4. 
9
 At the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818 France was admitted as an equal member into the ranks of 
the great powers and she based her claim for admission on the principle that she might be called upon to 
maintain order in her neighboring states. In C.K. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh 1815-1822 
(1925) p. 146. 
10
 Emile Cammaerts, The Keystone of Europe, p.1 
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regardless of the cost  this effort entailed.11 The peace settlements reached at the Peace 
of Paris in 1814 and the Treaty of Vienna in 181512 clearly reflected the value of the 
state over the nation. During this period territories were bartered among the 
sovereigns.13  
Between 1815 and 1848 intervention was a device used by Great Powers14 to 
control and assist the governments of weaker states. They however wanted to 
differentiate between intervention and war and even though they did intervene on a 
number of occasions, none of those acts were preceded by a declaration of war. There 
was a manifest determination amongst the Great Powers to establish the principle that 
intervention by force in the internal affairs of another state was a legitimate and legal 
act. Congresses, treaties and peace acts, which were quite frequent during this period, 
were a way of establishing, formalizing and confirming that legitimacy. The powers 
derived their legitimacy of intervention from the shared assumption established by 
                                                 
11
 Ibid. 
12
 The aspirations of the diplomats assembled in Vienna had not only been to maintain France within her 
old frontiers, but also to erase the outcome of the last twenty-five years, which had transformed the 
political outlook of Europe. It took only fifteen years to demonstrate how vain and unrealistic this had 
been. At the time of the Congress of Vienna, the main obsession of the European powers, which included 
Austria, Great Britain, Prussia and Russia, did evolve around the French and their role as well as 
aspirations in Europe, especially when it came to their lost territories. Beyond answering the numerous 
questions of frontiers and territory following collapse of the French Empire, the Congress of Vienna 
aimed at designing a powerful mechanism and a system of power that would prevent the potential 
dominion of Europe by any single power. Balance of Power was the number one item on the agenda and 
it was to be maintained at whatever cost. Emile Cammaerts, The Keystone of Europe, p. 1 
13
 When one sovereign lost a contested territory, he was compensated with another. The use of the term 
“souls” rather than “citizens” to refer to populations a sovereign would receive in compensation 
symbolized the view that states existed apart from their people. This is also evident in fact that dynastic 
claims over territory were favored over national claims by newly liberated peoples throughout Europe.  
The Belgians, Norwegians, and Poles were replaced under foreign rule; Belgium was incorporated into 
Holland and Norway into Sweden. Germany and Italy remained fragmented and disunited by design, even 
though Britain preferred a united Germany to help maintain a balance of power in Central Europe. In 
resolving the Polish question, Austria retained Galicia and Tarnopol and Prussia was given Posen and 
Thorn. The remainder of the Duchy of Warsaw came under the authority of the czar of Russia. In 
addition, Prussia obtained two-thirds of Saxony. 
14
 The four great powers that defeated Napoleon and restored peace and independence to the states of 
Europe were Austria, Great Britain, Russia and Prussia. 
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binding treaties, that they were guardians of the peace of Europe. This principle was 
evident in the words of Austrian minister Klemens von Metternich who asserted: 
“when domestic social unrest makes it impossible for a government to meet its 
treaty obligations that bind it to other countries, the right to intervene belongs as 
clearly and indisputably to every government which finds itself in danger of 
being drawn into the revolutionary maelstrom, as it does to any individual who 
must put out a fire in his neighbor’s house if it is not to spread to its own.”15  
 
The right to intervention was presented in a positive light, as great powers 
helping weaker states uphold their treaty obligations, rather than great powers meddling 
into the affairs of other states. 16 Fearing more revolutions and insurrections with the 
exceptions of Great Britain and France, the Powers in November 1820 adhered to the 
Troppau Protocol, which stated that: 
“States which have undergone a change of Government due to revolution, the 
results of which threaten other states, ipso facto cease to be members of the 
European Alliance, and remain excluded from it until their situation gives 
guarantees for legal order and stability. If owing to such alterations immediate 
danger threatens other states, the powers bind themselves, by peaceful means, or 
if need be by army to bring back the guilty state into the bosom of the Great 
Alliance.”17 
 
Intervention remained central to the ‘Congress System’ and rather controversial as 
Great Britain strongly opposed the Powers intervening into the affairs of other states.18 
British Foreign Secretary Castlereagh rejected the Protocol and the claim that 
intervention was the duty of the Alliance and officially declared the text as a clear 
                                                 
15
 Kalevi Holsti, “Governance Without Government: Polyarchy in Nineteenth-century European 
International Politics,” in James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds., Governance Without 
Government: Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 
1992), p. 261. 
16
 This common policy and the way of thinking was undermined in the 1820s and 1830s by disagreement 
amongst the great powers as to what constituted disorder and whether turmoil in a particular country 
constituted a threat to the peace of Europe. 
17
 Alan Sked, Europe’s Balance of Power 1815-1848, p. 6 
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violation of international law.19 Castlereagh established the British position in a paper of 
May 5, 1820, stating that the Quadruple Alliance was an alliance for the “liberation of a 
great proportion of the Continent of Europe from the military dominion of France…It 
never was, however intended as an Union for the Government of the World or for the 
Superintendence of the Internal Affairs of other States.”20 Britain and France believed 
that the right to intervene rested solely on the appeal of the government in distress for 
assistance. They adamantly rejected the argument that a right of intervention belonged 
to the alliance of five powers. However most of the disagreement between the Powers 
was more about the nature and the purpose of the five-power alliance and the contest for 
its leadership rather than a debate about the principle of intervention.21 
 The great powers of Europe perceived the act of recognition of new states as a 
stabilizer of security and a tool for the maintenance of the equilibrium among states. 
New entities were recognized as independent states in order to support the balance of 
power system. The great powers were bound by no principle of the self-determination of 
peoples or ethnic groupings.22 For the people and for their governments, the 
determination to return to peace was far more compelling than liberal and nationalist 
ideas.23  
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
18
 For the text see Kenneth Bourne, The Foreign Policy of Victorian England 1830-1902 (Clarendon 
Press; Oxford, 1970) pp. 198-207. 
19
 C.K.Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh 1812-1915, vol. II. pp. 322-323. 
20
 Castlereagh’s Confidential State Paper of May 5, 1820, in Ward and Gooch, eds., Cambridge History, 
vol. II, pp. 626-27. 
21
 Roger Bullen, The Great Powers and the Iberian Peninsula, 1815-48 in Alan Sked, Europe’s Balance 
of Power 1815-1848, p. 56. 
22
 Although nationalism was certainly used at the time, its expression and practice was strongly 
discouraged.  
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III. BELGIUM – THE BUFFER STATE 
A French ambassador at the time of Louis XIV commented that “The English 
will give the shirts off their backs to prevent the French from penetrating into the Low 
Countries.”24 Both the French and the British maintained a close interest in the fate of 
the Belgic Provinces.25 For military and economic reasons, the Northern Netherlands 
also had a great stake in the fate of Belgium.26 In the 18th century, long fortresses 
stretched along the border between the Habsburg-owned Austrian Netherlands 
(Belgium) and France. Interestingly, even though the fortresses were on Austrian soil, 
they were manned by Dutch garrisons in the interest of Europe.27 It was soon realized 
that fortification did not represent enough of a barrier to stop the northward expansion 
of the French troops.28 As a result, during the height of the allied offensive against 
Napoleon in the fall of 1813, the stadtholder-in-exile, later King William I of the 
Netherlands, requested the cession of all Belgium to Holland in order to build a new 
barrier against French aggression.29  
                                                                                                                                               
23
 Alan Sked, Europe’s Balance of Power 1815-1848, p. 15. 
24
 Herman Vander Linden, Belgium: The Making of  a Nation, trans. Sybil Jane (Oxford, 1920), p.161. 
25
 The main reason behind this was Britain’s strong belief that their possession by France or any other 
country in Europe would upset the balance of power and pose a threat to the British Isles. They were fully 
aware of the danger implied by the shrewd comment made by Napoleon: “Antwerp in the hands of a 
strong France was a pistol pointed at the heart of England.” Sir James Headlam-Morley, Studies in 
Diplomatic History, (London, 1930), ch. VI, “The Problem of Security”, cited in Daniel H. Thomas, The 
Guarantee of Belgian Independence and Neutrality in European Diplomacy, 1830’s-1930’s (1983) p.6. 
26
 These concerns were the capstone governing the politics and conduct of foreign affairs of the great 
European powers towards Belgium. Even though its size and military strength seemed insignificant, due 
to its geographic location and strategic relevance for the peace in Europe, Belgium’s destiny was closely 
tied with the interests of Great Britain, France and Germany. This country represented the focal point on 
which the interests of the European powers converged. In turn due to the fact that most of its history is 
characterized by foreign rule, Belgium depended on the great powers both militarily and diplomatically. 
27
 The Austrian presence significantly impacted the balance of power calculation as Austria was one of 
the four guarantors of the perpetual union of the Austrian Netherlands with the united provices to the 
north. Britain, Prussia, and Russia were the other three guarantors. 
28
 Ernst B. Haas, Belgium and the Balance of Power, pp. 7-8. 
29
 William I to Castlereagh, November 9, 1913 and Castlereagh to Aberdeen, November 23, 1813, cited in 
G. J. Renier, Great Britain, and the Establishment of the Kingdom of the Netherlands 1813-1815 
(London, 1930), pp. 205-207. 
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The Kingdom of the Netherlands which was created at the end of the Napoleonic 
Wars 30 was one of the most deliberate and carefully motivated decisions of the 
Quadruple Alliance of 1814.31 The unhappy union of the United Netherlands consisted 
of Belgium, Luxembourg and northern Netherlands.32 The powers disposed of the 
Southern Netherlands first at the Peace of Paris on May 30, 1814, and by the Final Act 
of the Vienna Congress on June 9, 1815 which stated: 
“In the interests of European peace, and of the balance of power, the Southern 
provinces were joined to the Northern Netherlands under the sovereignty of the 
House of Orange-Nassau, in order to form together an indivisible state under the 
constitution already existing in the North, altered to meet the circumstances.” 
 
William I was appointed as the new “legitimate” king and accepted this disposition on 
July 21, 1814 and from March 16, 1815 commenced his rule of the amalgamated 
kingdom.33 The Treaty of Vienna never consulted the Belgians about the decision to 
unite them with Holland in order to form a barrier against any French expansion and to 
preserve peace in Europe.34 Belgians who had a history of conquests of their territory 
and rule by other powers, perceived themselves as voiceless and knowing the ‘rules’ of 
the balance of power system, their inexperienced diplomats readily acquiesced to the 
wishes of the powers. On the surface, Holland took all possible measures to guarantee 
                                                 
30
 John W. Rooney, Jr., Revolt in the Netherlands Brussels – 1830 (1982) p. 1. 
31
 Ernst B. Haas, Belgium and the Balance of Power, p. 7. 
32
 Arthur Wellesley Wellington, Dispatch, Correspondence, and memoranda of Field Marshal Arthur, 
Duke of Wellington (London, 8 vols., 1867-80), “Statement of the Expenditure on the Fortresses of the  
Pays-Bas during the year 1829,” and “Statement in English Currency of the Expenditures on the 
Fortresses in the Netherlands to 31st December, 1829.” These enclosures are attached to the letter of 
colonel Jones to the Duke of Wellington, 12 May 1830, pp. 32-33 in Revolt in the Netherlands Brussels – 
1830, (1982) p. 1. 
33
 The primary goal of the Congress of Vienna was to establish a new balance of power in Europe, which 
would prevent imperialism within Europe, and maintain the peace between the great powers. Moreover, it 
hoped to prevent political revolutions such as French Revolution and maintain status quo. Ernst B. Haas, 
Belgium and the Balance of Power, p. 6. 
34
 Adrien de Meeus, History of the Belgians, p. 262 
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that the relationship between the south and north would be based on equality.35 
However, in reality it was a source of disappointment for the Belgians whose 
dissatisfaction and grievances only increased exponentially over time.  
 The worsening situation only exacerbated the differences between two peoples. 
The antipathy between the Belgian people and the Dutch is founded on the diversity of 
commercial and agricultural interests between the two parts of the kingdom as well as 
on the opposition between the religious principles.36 With respect to economy the Dutch 
had the traditional economy of trade and very open while Belgians had less developed 
local industries. Hence, while the Dutch wanted free trade, the Belgians called for the 
protection of tariffs. Religion and language also pointed towards significant differences 
between the French speaking Roman Catholic south and the Dutch speaking Protestant 
north.  Belgians demanded higher role for the Church in the government which went 
against the desires of the Dutch. These differences were probably not sufficient to cause 
a riot however the worsening situation within the Kingdom and the oppression of the 
Belgian population awakened nationalistic feelings helping the Belgian people develop 
a strong sense of national identity and unifying them in their fight for freedom.  
IV. KING WILLIAM’S REIGN 
History has shown that even an unlikely union between different groups can 
survive the test of time provided it has strong leadership able to afford the necessary 
balance and accommodate diverse needs. King William’s rule proved to be a bitter 
                                                 
35
 Two capitals were established in Brussels and at The Hague, and the Estates General was appointed to 
sit in each alternately. No discrimination was allowed between the two peoples, and there was to be an 
equal number of Belgian and Dutch deputies, which was to ensure that no part of the country would have 
a chance of oppressing the other. The Constitution guaranteed freedom of worship for both groups. Ibid. 
pp.262-263. 
36
 Matternich, Memoirs,  Metternich to Wessenberg, Oct. 3, 1830, vol. V pp. 35-36.   
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disappointment to the Belgian people.37 In response to the threat posed by Napoleon’s 
return from Elba, William I appointed a select commission of Belgians and Hollanders 
to consider codifying the Fundamental Law of the Kingdom.38  Another point of 
contention and Belgian frustration was the fact that they bore greater responsibility in 
paying taxes.39 Belgian notables decided to reject the modified Fundamental Law and as 
the bourgeoisie of Belgium increased in economic power, they demanded a greater role 
in solving political and social questions. Instead of trying to accommodate the Belgian 
demand, William I disregarded their claim and proclaimed the law as accepted.  
Despite disagreement with William’s ruling, the Belgians initially were divided. 
Walloon and Flemish differences, although important, did not yet have a major effect 
upon political alignments. The clerical question did, as the Catholic party defended the 
position and authority of the Roman Catholic clergy while the Liberals, under the 
influence of the principles of the French Revolution, demanded more toleration and less 
clerical influence. Yet both Catholic and Liberals were Roman Catholics, and in their 
Catholicism shared a dislike for living under Protestant rule.40 By his poor judgment 
and bad policies, William managed to unite Liberals and Catholics into a united 
opposition. On November 8, 1828 a National Coalition of Catholics and Liberals was 
formed under the fitting name of the Union of Opposites. It endured for 14 years. 
                                                 
37
 Many foreign diplomatic observers noted that King William I did not have the capacity and leadership 
skills necessary to keep the union together. He failed to understand the religious and cultural sensitivities 
of the Belgians. Ibid. p. 20. 
38
 Ministers were responsible only to William, the King appointed over half of the Senate, and the Second 
Chamber could only reject or approve but not amend legislative proposals. A problem came about with 
respect to representation in the Chamber. The Belgians whose region possessed 3,400,000 inhabitants 
compared with Holland’s 2,000,000 insisted that representation be proportionate to the size of the 
population. Edmudson, The Law Countries, in the Cambridge Modern History, Vol. X, p. 521, 
39
 Even though the two regions were to share their joint debts, the Belgians’ liabilities amounted to thirty-
two million florins while those of Holland were two billion. The Belgians thus were obliged to pay taxes 
to finance a debt which was mostly not theirs. Jonathan E. Helmreich. Belgium and Europe: A Study in 
Small Power Diplomacy, p. 10. 
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The fact that the Dutch always thought of Belgium as a territory annexed to Holland 
rather than as equal part of the state did nothing to alleviate grievances of the 
Belgians.41 Even as early as 1819, the animosity between the Belgium and the 
Dutchman was difficult to ignore.42  
Failing to recognize the signs of growing displeasure, King William made an 
attempt to promote national feeling of unity by urging the acceptance of Dutch as the 
national and official language. This caused not only an outrage but a problem for 
Belgians who spoke French or Walloon, which included nearly all the professional men 
and leaders of society. Even though some concessions were made in 1829, by then a 
majority of the leading figures of the south, receiving considerable support both in 
Flanders and in Wallonia, were calling for autonomy from Dutch rule.43 It was only a 
matter of time when Belgian grievances would turn into violent protest.  
V. THE BELGIAN REVOLUTION  
“What danger can a slave incur? 
Better to die than live in slavery. 
Throw off the yoke of the oppressor 
And let the stranger fall into our blows. 
Sacred love of country give us fortitude and audacity. 
My country gave me life, 
I shall give it liberty?” 
 
                                                                                                                                               
40
 Jonathan E. Helmreich, Belgium and Europe: A Study in Small Power Diplomacy, p. 11. 
41
 From the very start the Dutch made their intention clear of keeping control of most governmental and 
administrative posts. The home ministry employed 117 Dutch officials compared to 11 from Belgium in 
1830; of the army’s approximately 2500 officers, less than a fifth were Belgian. Edmundson, The Low 
Countries p. 525. 
42
 A large number of songs appeared in Belgium attesting to this: “I’m not a Dutchman, And I don’t want 
to be one. Yes, I am a Belgian, And that’s what I think is grand. And I am proud, upon my word, Of the 
name of my Fatherland. Adrien de Meeus, History of the Belgians, p. 263. 
 12
King William wrongly assumed that the patriotic lyrics of an opera could not cause a 
disturbance. He saw no apparent reason to ban the performance of La Muette de Portici 
in Brussels on August 25, 1830, even though it had previously been prohibited.44 It was 
precisely these lines of sacrifice, bravery and righteousness that moved the audience and 
emboldened their deeply engrained patriotic feelings. At the beginning it was not clear 
whether the revolt was aimed at the Great Netherlands state, Protestantism, and 
constitution, the system of government, the government itself, or the dynasty. The one 
thing that was clear was that it represented an attack of Belgium on Holland.45 
 Even though William’s overconfident temperament and political ideology 
played an important part in the causes of the revolution, they provide insufficient 
explanation of the events which unfolded. The Revolution occurred for more profound 
reasons. Frequently, language, religion, and economics have been viewed as the 
underlying causes of the revolt. Interestingly enough, British diplomats, pointed to these 
factors as potential problem areas as early as 1814.46 The basic causes of the eruption of 
1830 were the deep beliefs of each people that they were different, and that their 
uniqueness would be overshadowed by the other. This belief of “separateness” which 
was being violated by the Dutch who were trying to dominate the Belgian people 
created a feeling of animosity and grievance.47 
                                                                                                                                               
43
 Jonathan E. Helmreich. Belgium and Europe: A Study in Small Power Diplomacy, p. 12. See also 
Strikwerda, House Divided, p. 27-30. 
44
 John W. Rooney, Jr., Revolt in the Netherlands Brussels – 1830 (1982), p. 1. 
45
 E. H. Kossmann, The Low Countries 1780-1940, p. 151. 
46
 Public Record Office, Diplomatic Archives, FO 37/81, James to Castlereagh, 27 October 1815, p. 7 
November 1815, 14 November 1815, and FO 37/88, 10 February 1815 in John W. Rooney, Jr. Revolt in 
the Netherlands Brussels – 1830 p. 4. 
47
 For an in depth analyses on the Belgian dislike for the Dutch see Augustus Beamount, Adventures of 
Two Americans in the Siege of Brussels, September 1830 (Cornhill, 1831).  
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The Bruxellois did not at first think about demanding a complete separation 
from Holland.48  Instead of the anticipated and much feared French oppression in 
September of 1830, the European powers faced the challenge of internal revolution. 
Berlin, London, Vienna and St. Petersburg were confronted with the decision of 
whether to lead armed aid to Holland in maintaining the status quo or whether a 
different course was to be followed.49 Each of them individually considered what was in 
the best interest for their countries. Tsar Nicholas I of Russia was interested in the 
success of the Netherlands for military, dynastic, and economic reasons and he 
profoundly feared French expansion.50 The foreign minister of the new French 
government, Count Mole, faced a dilemma regarding the issue of whether France should 
allow the dispatch of British and Prussian troops to Belgium to restore order or whether 
the proper policy should be to give aid to the insurrection. Another option for the French 
was to stay neutral in this matter and leave things up to the other European powers. 
During the rebellion, the British seemed to support the Belgian efforts to challenge the 
existing order and break into the European system. At first, London’s reaction to the 
riots was nonchalant.51 The British Foreign office was convinced that the Brussels affair 
centered on local grievances. The Tory Prime Minister at the time of the revolt, the 
Duke of Wellington, regretted the disruption of the Vienna system, however at the time 
he did not want to pledge British military aid to King William I, partly because he 
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regarded him as a weak ruler and partly because Britain was rather militarily weak. 
England’s interests necessitated stable relations with France, and when Mole indicated 
that France wished arrangement of the Belgian matter, the Duke was willing to 
cooperate.52 
Mole took initiative by telling the Prussian ambassador in Paris, Werther, that 
France would refrain from any intervention in any country on her borders, as long as no 
other major European state intervened first. By announcing this, France proclaimed that 
any entry of Prussian troops into Belgium would be followed immediately by the 
involvement of the French army as well.53 This decision was rejected by the European 
powers and only the British cabinet expressed conditional agreement. Other powers 
were more willing to get involved. The Prussians had mobilized at once and were 
prepared to march into Belgium. 
On October 5, 1830 King William I finally made an appeal for help to end the 
insurrection. The Dutch monarch based his appeal on the Treaty of the Eight Articles, 
which has made the victorious powers guarantors of his dominions. The French 
government was the first to take the initiative. It appointed the experienced diplomat 
Talleyrand as the new ambassador to the Court of St. James. His task was to persuade 
the British government to call a conference of all the interested powers to resolve the 
issue.54 William’s ability to end the revolt was questionable. However even attempting 
to do so might have caused the French to move in and aid the Belgians and the Orange 
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monarch was not in a position to risk a war against France without European support.55 
In the meantime the fighting continued and a large volunteer force arrived from 
Wallonia to defend Brussels against the Dutch army. Belgians fought fiercely and 
defeated the Dutch in a battle that lasted for three days outside the Brussels palace. On 
September 27 the Dutch withdrew.56 The Belgians rather quickly formed a provisional 
government, which declared independence on October 4, 1830. On November 3, a 
National Congress was formed by an electorate of 30,000 men and on November 18 the 
National Congress of Belgium declared its independence.57 Belgium’s declaration of 
independence was the starting point for negotiations among the great powers of its 
future. 
VI. THE LONDON CONFERENCE NEGOTIATIONS  
The Conference of London58 opened on November 4, 1830 and was crucial in 
determining the future of Belgium. The Great Powers, rather than Belgium and Holland, 
occupied themselves with establishing the arrangements to “combine the future 
independence of Belgium with the stipulations of the Treaties, with the interests and 
security of other Powers, and with the preservation of European equilibrium.”59 The 
great power diplomacy of the Alliance period was characterized by a general sense of 
community and the belief that the collective needs of all took precedence over the 
particular interests of individual members. From the beginning, the preservation of the 
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peace was established as the goal of post-Napoleonic diplomacy, and even though their 
focus and fear was around France, it entailed any other state which may pose a threat to 
Europe’s stability.60 
The plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia and France 
declared at its first session that it would not even be possible to reunite the two countries 
without war.61 The rivalry at the conference was mainly between England and France 
and both took the initiative in determining the future of Belgium. It was Lord 
Palmerston, one of the ablest Foreign Secretaries England ever had and the French 
Ambassador Prince Talleyrand, the most prominent figure in European diplomacy of 
that time, who gave Belgium her status among the European nations, naturally to suit 
their own countries’ purposes.62 On its first day, the Conference issued the first of its 
seventy protocols. It ordered the establishment of an armistice and the evacuation by 
both parties of all areas, which had not formed a part of their respective territories prior 
to May 30, 1814.63 The first protocol declared the withdrawal of all troops. 64 
A change of British governments did not work in favor of the Dutch as even 
before Palmerston replaced Wellington, the Belgians made a gain when the conference 
proposed an armistice based on the borders given Holland by the Treaty of Paris of 
1814. The protocol further benefited the Belgians by referring to them not as rebels but 
as recognized belligerents which significantly promoted their cause in further 
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negotiations.65 Some of the main problems that arose at the conference were related to 
the questions of boundaries, the division of the national debt and the navigation of the 
rivers and canals. The international aspects included a buffer between France and state 
to the northeast and the problem of the balance of power and general security.66 There 
was a uniform belief among the European Powers that a monarchy rather than a republic 
would be a preferred form of government for Belgium. A republic could not have been 
acceptable to Palmerston and would never have been tolerated by the Conservative 
Powers. Some politicians went as far as claiming that if Belgium proclaimed itself a 
republic, it would start a new revolution.67 
Russia, Austria and Prussia were opposed to Belgian independence. The 
simultaneous outbreak of revolution in Poland prevented a Russian-Austrian-Prussian 
military intervention in support of William I against the rebellious Provinces. However, 
Lord Palmerston’s new government wholeheartedly supported recognition. It was 
precisely the Franco-British coalition that imposed a reversal on the London Conference 
affording Belgium its official independence in January 1831.68 The initiative and formal 
motion which initiated the process of recognition was introduced by Lord Palmerston 
and seconded by Prince Talleyrand on December 18, 1830.69 
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As pointed out by one distinguished Belgian international lawyer, the future 
independence of Belgium was stated in strict terms which had to be abided by: “the 
preservation of the balance of power; the principle of security of the other powers; and 
the principle of maintaining the treaties of 1815 which tied Belgium to the security 
system of the victor powers.”70 William strongly protested also against a new disposal 
by the Powers of Belgian provinces by claiming that it was against the principles of 
international law for the powers to rescind their decision.71 
The conditions, limitations and qualifications to full national sovereignty, which 
the Conference pointed to in its seventh protocol, were the main subject of deliberations 
during the month of January 1831. In two key protocols, the so-called “Bases of 
Separation” of Belgium from Holland or the Eighteen Articles are defined, and the main 
points of contention between the two entities were addressed, not to everyone’s 
satisfaction. First, the Conference prefaced the fixing of the borders and the division of 
the public debt with another declaration concerning the European obligations of the two 
nations. It further pointed out to Brussels that any future arrangements would be 
subordinated to the rights of the Conference members. Finally, the plenipotentiaries 
made it clear to the Belgian authorities that no new Belgian conquests or territorial 
aggrandizements were to be made at the expense of Holland.72 The plenipotentiaries 
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also added a condition of neutrality that was to be achieved with Belgian 
independence.73 
One week later, the conference issued anther protocol which stated: 
“Belgium assumes 16/31 of the total public debt of the former Kingdom of the 
Netherlands; that while the final debt settlement was worked out by bilateral 
negotiations, Belgium pay its share of the service charges; that Belgium should 
enjoy free and unhampered trading privileges with the Dutch colonies.”74 
 
The provisional Belgian government rejected the territorial and the financial “Bases of 
Separation” and refused to ratify these proposals.75 London warned that in the event of 
Belgian failure to accept the separation plan the powers would break off relations with 
Belgium and refuse to recognize her independence.76  
The choice of the new King was also a subject of great debate. Lord Palmerston 
took measures to prevent such a possibility by introducing a proposal according to 
which no prince of the ruling houses represented at the conference would be eligible for 
the Belgian throne. After a couple of eliminations, the British Cabinet obtained on June 
4, 1831 the election of its own protégé, Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, who 
had been married to the late Princess Charlotte of Great Britain and Ireland and was 
known to contemplate a second marriage with Louise of Orleans, daughter of the King 
of the French.77  
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Sponsored by the Conference, Leopold had been engaged in weeks of 
negotiations with a Belgian deputation in London, the essence of which was to negotiate 
the acquisition of Luxembourg for the choice of Leopold as king and the acceptance of 
the remaining articles of the Basis of Separation.78 Leopold’s intimate adviser, Baron 
Stockmar, confirmed that the powers were willing to accept this deal since they were 
desperate by June for some sort of Belgian settlement.79 After the Treaty of Eighteen 
Articles was announced on June 26, 1831, the Belgian National Congress not only 
speedily elected Leopold King, but on July 12, 1831 accepted the Eighteen Articles.80 It 
seemed that the armistice was finally achieved and that the Europe was on its way to a 
solution to the Belgium problem. However, King William flatly refused to even 
consider these terms.81 On August 2, 1831 Dutch troops invaded Belgium.82 Paris, 
without consulting the conference, reacted by sending an army comprised of 50,000 
soldiers into Belgium. To avoid risking an engagement with the French troops, the 
Dutch commander rapidly withdrew his forces.83 
As soon as the armistice had been reestablished the plenipotentiaries returned to 
finding a final settlement acceptable to both parties. It was becoming apparent that there 
was no hope that Holland would accepted the Eighteen Articles, nor could the status 
quo be permitted to last indefinitely, as Belgium or Holland would recommence 
hostilities, particularly over the bitter Luxembourg question. Threatening Holland with a 
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naval blockade to prevent further hostilities, the powers extended the treaty draft on 
November 14, 1831 to a definite and irrevocable instrument, to be adhered to not only 
by the two main parties, but also by the conference powers themselves. Through this 
means, the final and definite separation of the two countries was to be made binding on 
all the major powers, who became the guarantors of the arrangement.84 
This was the famous Treaty of the Twenty-Four Articles85, which despite a 
seven year-delay was destined to be the final arrangement establishing the independence 
of Belgium, defining the borders and regulating the relations between not only Belgium 
and Holland but also of Belgium and the rest of Europe.86 The second major provision 
dealt with mutual transit, navigation rights and the partition of debt.87 In contrast to their 
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earlier position, the plenipotentiaries now ruled that the Belgian share of the joint debt 
would amount to 8,400,000 florins of total annual charges, with Belgium being freed 
from any payments pending the creation of the machinery for transferring the money. 
The remaining fund of the Kingdom of Netherlands was to be divided equitably through 
a bilateral agreement.88 In addition, not only was the territory and the neutrality of 
Belgium guaranteed, but the financial, transit and miscellaneous articles were placed 
under the protection of the conference as well. While the Belgian government declared 
its readiness to ratify almost immediately, The Hague refused. Berlin, Vienna or St. 
Petersburg seemed just as disinterested and London and Paris did not exchange 
ratifications with Belgium either.89 
The fruitless and tiresome negotiations continued during the summer of 1832.  
Immediately after the French troops were safely pulled out of Belgium, Britain and 
France reopened negotiations with the Dutch government. Their ultimate aim was the 
full acceptance of the Twenty-Four Articles by the Hague, but having as a minimum 
objective the conclusion of some sort of a provisional arrangement, pending the 
conclusion of a mutually acceptable final treaty. On December 31, 1832, Palmerston 
and Talleyrand proposed to the Dutch an interim agreement which provided for: 
“evacuation of all territory still occupied by each party in defiance of the borders drawn 
by the treaty, opening of navigation on the Meuse and the Schedlt, the granting of 
amnesties and the exchange of prisoners, the opening of the Sittard trade route to 
Germany, mutual arms reductions, to be followed by raising the blockade and embargo 
still in effect against Dutch trade.”90 
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Britain and France demanded an unlimited armistice and full Dutch recognition 
of Belgian neutrality. On March 9, 1833, a treaty was concluded at Berlin in which it 
was provided: “that the London Conference should be reconstituted after the cessation 
of all coercion measures; that the Twenty-Four Articles should be the basis of an 
entirely new negotiations, in which the Belgian and Dutch governments should 
participate as equals; that the consent of the German Bund to the Luxembourg-Limburg 
arrangements of the treaty of November 15, 1831 was an essential condition; and the 
three monarchs agreed that any new arrangement could not put more onerous conditions 
on Holland than those already agreed to”.91 The new negotiations would be broken off if 
a new attempt at coercing Holland was to be made. Finally, the three rulers pledged to 
assist Holland if her territory were attacked or if Britain and France were to act contrary 
to these stipulations.92 
The Conference reopened in London and during the summer and fall of 1833 
attempted to work out a new treaty that would satisfy the wishes of the Dutch in the 
disputed transit and navigation clauses of the Twenty-Four Articles. The demands of 
Holland clearly indicated that they had no wish for a final treaty and the negotiations 
made no progress. Finally, in November of 1833, Palmerston demanded from the new 
Dutch plenipotentiary, whether the King had taken any measures to obtain the consent 
of the German Bund to the proposed division of Luxembourg and Limburg. Upon 
learning that William had not done so, Palmerston declared the conference suspended 
until The Hague would give evidence of being ready to accept the Twenty-Four 
Articles, or show some positive desire to negotiate.93 Amazingly, no such signals were 
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given for the next five years which ensured suspension of the conference over those 
years. 
After reaffirming their opposition to compelling any settlement from the Dutch 
and any changes in European public law due to revolutionary activity, the three eastern 
absolute monarchs on September 20, 1833 began a long period of regarding Belgium as 
a public outcast.94 Britain and France, on the other hand, immediately established full 
diplomatic relations with Brussels. Eastern Europe opted for a different course of action. 
Russia refused to recognize Leopold I and had no diplomatic relations with Brussels. 
Berlin and Vienna showed their displeasure with the new state by merely accrediting 
charges to Leopold. In addition constant friction existed between Belgium and Prussia 
over border issues, over the uneasy state of affairs in Luxembourg, and over alleged 
Belgian’s involvement in the early Kulturkampf in the Prussian Rhineland, which 
reached serious proportions in 1838.95 
 
 The Conference of London determined the future of Belgium. The Great Powers 
perceived themselves as legally responsible for negotiating an agreement between the 
Dutch and the Belgians in order to preserve peace and balance of power in Europe, 
ensure preservation of the principle of security of the other powers and the principle of 
maintaining the treaties of 1815 which tied Belgium to the security system of the victor 
powers. There are a number of reasons that contributed to negotiations ending in non-
agreement in 1833.  
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• Perceived Power Asymmetry 
One of the reasons is the issue of perceived power asymmetry. In the 
negotiations theory, perceived asymmetries whatever their bases may be produce 
different attitudes and strategies in the exercise of power by the strong. The party 
perceived as the strong tends to adopt the take-it-or-leave-it strategy toward its 
negotiation partner.96At the London Conference, not all issues pertaining to the 
Conference were discussed at the Foreign Office. Many crucial matters were discussed 
and decided in the countryside. Talleyrand spent weekends with Wellington and 
Aberdeen, the English minister for foreign affairs and after the Whigs came to power, 
with Palmerson and Grey. In addition Palmerston, Lord Grey, and Prince Leopold spent 
several days in the country before proposing the Prince Leopold’s candidacy of the 
Belgian throne.97 Leopold himself gave a politically important dinner before accepting 
the Belgian throne and entertained Talleyrand, Palmerston, and the Belgian delegates. 
This practice indicated the concentration of power in a small circle of leading members 
of the great powers. It was rather obvious that in London, the central figures of power 
and decision-makers were Wellington, Palmerston, and Talleyrand, the leaders of the 
Anglo-French entente.98 With this nucleus of influence it was possible for Talleyrand 
and Palmerston to seize the initiative on select issues and, by an adept sense of timing, 
dictate both the agenda and the pace of negotiations. 99 They used their power and 
influence to force those decisions on the Eastern powers. The power was self-perceived 
by Talleyrand and Palmerston and used to dominate negotiations in order to fulfill their 
self-imposed responsibility of maintaining peace in Europe. For them this was a greater 
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good far more important than the wishes of individual states, which in this case 
represented the Dutch and Belgium. It was apparent the Dutch were not involved in 
those negotiations but were rather only informed of the decisions once they have 
already been made. This played an instrumental role in King William feeling helpless 
and powerless. He failed to recognize that he did indeed possess the power however 
needed to adopt appropriate counter-strategy in order to borrow sources of power and 
move the great powers into the direction in which he would like the negotiations and 
outcome to go.100 
• Mediator’s role 
The great power’s role with respect to the negotiations is questionable. The 
conflicting parties call on or rather allow mediators into negotiations because they are 
seeking a better solution to their conflict than they are able to achieve themselves.101 
Mediator’s  role is to invent outcomes and help move parties towards reaching a jointly 
acceptable outcome. Furthermore, one of the key goals of mediators is the ability to 
redefine the issues and expand the possibilities around the contested issues to include 
items that can be traded against each other.102 For example, a mediator can initially help 
the parties reach agreement on matters that are not considered of vital importance and 
help the parties define the subject of the negotiations in a manner that allows the 
circumvention of vital issues on which no compromise is possible.103 The great powers 
proceeded to develop a formula for negotiations. Most of the Bases of Separation 
Agreement, the Eighteen Articles and the subsequent Twenty-Four Articles Agreement 
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were drafted by the powers without consulting the Dutch or the Belgians. Rather than 
assuming the role of mediators and facilitators, the great powers were conducting 
negotiations amongst themselves consulting the two parties in conflict only to present 
final agreements. In addition, when parties refused to accept as Belgium did with 
respect to the Bases of Separation agreement, instead of searching for a compromise 
solution or finding a solution that better matched Belgian interests, the powers 
immediately issued an ultimatum. The great powers never quite managed to broaden the 
spectrum of options or possibilities, nor did they try to change parteis’ perspective and 
perception of negotiations. In being so adamant about following a strict formula the 
great powers only decreased the chances of reaching an agreement.  
• Strategic Issues 
Related to the above reason were also the strategic issues which played a 
significant role in the outcome of negotiations. This is evident in the perception of the 
outcome of the London Conference. It has been noted that the conference was one of the 
“notable victories gained by the Concert of Europe in the nineteenth century”104 
However, from the perspective of the two negotiating parties, the events and 
negotiations were perceived far from successful. For the Dutch the year of 1830 
represented the low point in their history as they lost the Southern Netherlands. This 
shook the nation’s confidence and opened questioned their ability to continue their role 
as a strong nation on the international stage. For the Belgians, the proceedings in 
London were frustrating and even humiliating experience as they had to abide by the 
terms of the great powers. They indeed achieved independence however just like the 
Dutch they were a subject of the wishes and terms of the great powers. The former 
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Belgian delegate to the London Conference Sylvain Van de Weyer described Belgian 
independence as a “European transaction”.105 This was evident in the negotiations 
during which the great powers only focused on achieving their own objectives, which 
were strategic in nature and involved maintaining status quo in Europe and preventing 
major wars from erupting. Hence, their goals stood in the way of the negotiations as 
they proposed a formula and pressured the two parties to abide by the formula. This 
caused dissatisfaction and aversion of the parties towards the mediator and in turn 
eliminated some of the opportunities which could have been pursued if the powers 
showed more flexibility and concern for the interests of the parties.  
• Lack of Trust 
Another reason for the incomplete result of the negotiations was the lack of trust 
among the parties and towards the great powers of Europe. Trust as well as credibility in 
negotiations is imperative in order for each side to feel sure of the other side’s desire to 
reach a negotiated outcome.106 The Belgian people did not trust the Dutch King as they 
perceived him as selfish and single-minded ruler concerned only about maintaining his 
power. Even though he made promises of equality between the Dutch and the Belgian 
people, his actions clearly pointed out that he wanted to assimilate the Belgian people 
into the Dutch culture. On the other hand, King William did not trust the great powers. 
In his eyes, the powers lost all credibility when they decided to abandon their decisions 
from 1815. From the beginning he protested against a new disposal by the powers of 
Belgian provinces and argued that according to the international law the great powers 
had no right to revert their decision made in Vienna. Throughout negotiations, the 
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powers never attempted to establish trust among negotiating parties. In addition, they 
never attempted to re-establish their relationship with the Dutch King. In negotiations 
there are numerous ways in which the mediator or parties can assist in enhancing trust. 
This can be achieved by improving their capacity to understand the problem, 
demonstrating a genuine interest in trying to help the two sides reach their objectives, 
by not using threats or ultimatums, by making concessions and showing the two sides 
that the negotiations and taking action is in their best interest. The great powers 
however never managed to establish an environment conductive to enhancing trust 
among negotiators.  
• Forward vs. Backward Looking Outcomes  
Another reason was King William I himself. Initially he appealed to the great 
powers to support his fight against the revolution and to ‘rescue’ the kingdom which 
they established in 1815. He expected the great powers to side with him and assist in 
‘mending’ the kingdom back together. When he realized that the goals of the great 
powers did not coincide with his own he refused to negotiate. Instead of focusing on the 
benefits he could gain from negotiations, King William was strictly focused on losses 
compared with his past situation. He was hanging onto a notion of his past-based rights, 
ignoring the new present-based claims on rights based on feelings of nationality. By 
looking backwards to the time when he was the ruler of the great kingdom, he was not 
able to divorce himself from the notion that he would lose the kingdom. He was 
disappointed to find out that the goals of the great powers were mainly to prevent any 
revolutions from turning into major wars, even if that meant reverting their earlier 
decisions. Apparently, William was outraged by this realization to the point that even 
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after his short military campaign which afforded him more equitable conditions as 
outlined in the Twenty-Four articles of October 1831, he took no advantage of them. 
The refusal of this agreement only hurt the Netherlands which was driven into complete 
diplomatic isolation. In negotiations Forward-Looking Outcomes look for mechanisms 
to prevent future violence as they seek outcomes that “reach beyond the conflict to 
opportunities for cooperation and problem solving, and try to prevent the resurgence of 
the old conflict in a new, later form by resolving its underlying causes”.107 This is 
precisely what the new arrangement that entailed Belgium neutrality promised. It was a 
mechanism that was implemented to prevent future conflicts from occurring in the 
whole region. However, William’s short sidedness prevented him in seeing the long-
term benefits of negotiations and the proposed formula.  
• Mutually Hurting Stalemate and Mutually Enticing Opportunity 
As the negotiations in London progressed it became obvious that there was no 
Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS) nor Mutually Enticing Opportunity (MEO). 
Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS) is a situation in which the parties are locked in a 
conflict from which they cannot escalate to victory, the deadlock is painful to both of 
them and they see a way out.108 The point at which they decide to do something about 
their situation is upon realizing that that pain would only increase unless something is 
not done about it. However at the London conference there was never a point at which 
both parties felt they were ‘hurting’. One of the tasks of the mediator is to balance the 
parties in the conflict in such a way as to produce the hurting stalemate, if it’s not 
naturally produced by the circumstances on the ground that leads them to see a mediated 
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solution as the best way out. The key is to do so in a way so that the parties do not 
perceive the mediators as taking sides but rather as an impartial player.109 The great 
powers never made such an attempt. Similarly, there was no Mutually Enticing 
Opportunity, a concept defined as a scenario and a point in time when both parties 
perceive an attractive opportunity that pulls them out of a stalemate and eventually leads 
them to an agreement.  
 Surprisingly in 1831, William still expected Belgium to revert to him in the 
future and he did not want to compromise his position by abandoning his sovereign 
rights over his Southern provinces. This is due to the fact that he did not believe that the 
powers would betray the arrangement of Vienna, he undermined the credibility and 
sustainability of the ‘artificial equilibrium’ created in 1830.110 Therefore a combination 
of the lack of trust in both the powers and their intentions as well as in the viability of 
the system the powers created caused William to refuse the agreement and wait for a 
better offer. When that offer never arrived and Belgium established its viability, in 
March of 1938 William declared his willingness to accept the articles.   
 The great powers clearly failed to exercise their power over negotiations. Rather 
than establishing themselves as impartial mediators and moving negotiations towards 
and agreement, they engaged as a third party in the conflict with their own conditions 
that were to be achieved by the outcome of the negotiations. They failed to establish 
trust and equality among the parties and to present themselves as a trustworthy 
participant in the negotiations. William felt betrayed by them and his perception of their 
role in the negotiations impeded his decision-making and limited the spectrum of 
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options available to him. He felt that the powers reversed their allegiance from the 
Netherlands to Belgium and simply refused to cooperate with them.  
The great powers showed very little flexibility in their stringent formula as well 
as minimal regard for the needs of the Dutch. Their efforts were limited to establishing a 
formula and once the two or one of the parties refused to sign, they extended 
ultimatums. There was an apparent lack of effort to find out the needs of the parties 
which impeded the process of negotiations and limited opportunities for an agreement. 
From the beginning of negotiations the Dutch perceived proposed formula as a loss. 
What was detrimental for the negotiations is the fact that the powers never attempted to 
change that perception and establish the framework of negotiations conducive to 
creating opportunities rather than providing a single inflexible formula which led to a 
dead end. 
VII. POSTSCRIPT 
In the period between 1833 and 1838 Belgium enjoyed the advantage of the 
interim arrangements. Those included full control of all Luxembourg and Limburg, and 
furthermore no required payments on the Belgian share of the debt. This state of affairs 
became increasingly bothersome to unyielding William I who in March 1838, suddenly 
declared his readiness to accept the Twenty-Four Articles, and demanded immediate 
Belgian evacuation of the territories to be given to Holland.111 
Now it was time for the Belgians, to protest against the Twenty-Four Articles 
and to demand their alteration, especially the financial and territorial clauses.112 The 
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territorial exchanges were mostly to be made based on languages spoken in the 
territories. The London Conference found itself in full session again. By summer of 
1838 the Conference had come to a general agreement that while the Belgian share of 
the debt with total annual charges of 8,400,000 florins, should be reduced in favor of 
Belgium, the territorial division must be left unchanged. Naturally, Belgium was 
outraged. It immediately reverted to the one technique that had worked in the past. 
Volunteers gathered around the flags, ministries fell, Belgians armed themselves and the 
demand for war echoed throughout the country. Leopold I openly declared that Belgium 
would never acquiesce to such an agreement. This opposition to the decisions of 
London continued during the most of 1838. Finally, on December 6, 1838, the 
Conference presented Brussels with an ultimatum in which the final terms were 
stipulated. Belgium was to evacuate the disputed areas and in turn her share of the debt 
would be reduced to 5,200,000 florins, and she would be freed from having to pay any 
of the arrears, which had been accumulating since 1831.113 
Initially, France refused to accept and abide by the ultimatum, which encouraged 
the Belgians to hold out for two more months. However, after the unconditional French 
agreement reached London, late in January 1839, the government of Leopold I was left 
with no alternative. The revised Twenty-Four Articles were signed by Belgium in May 
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and ratified early in June, 1839. The signed agreement was not significantly different 
from the one proposed in 1831. 
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